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D'Arcy Leitch* The Constitutionality of Classification: Indigenous
Overrepresentation and Security Policy
in Canadian Federal Penitentiaries
This article examines one component of the Correctional Service of Canada's
(CSC) risk classification scheme. The CSC uses the Custody Rating Scale (CRS),
a 12-item actuarial instrument, to measure risk and to provide security classification
recommendations. Empirical data shows that while CRS recommendations may have
some predictive validity, certain of the 12 items the CRS includes do not, particularly
for Indigenous prisoners. This article makes the case that the inclusion of such items
in the CRS violates prisoner's rights under section 7 of the Charter by depriving them
of liberty in a manner that is arbitrary and overbroad. Habeas corpus is discussed as
a feasible remedy to unconstitutional security classification in prisons, consistent with
the evolution of the section 10(c) jurisprudence. The implications of unconstitutional
security classification policies in relation to remedial provisions of the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act, namely section 81, are highlighted throughout.
Le present article examine une composante du systeme de classification des risques
du Service correctionnel du Canada (SCC). Le SCC utilise I'Echelle de classement
par niveau de securite (ECNS), un instrument actuariel en 12 points, pour mesurer
le risque et formuler des recommandations sur le classement selon le niveau de
securite. Les donnees empiriques montrent que meme si les recommandations
selon I'ECNS peuvent avoir une certaine validite predictive, certains des 12 elements
inclus dans I'ECNS ne le font pas, en particulier pour les detenus autochtones.
Cet article etablit que ('inclusion de tels elements dans I'ECNS viole les droits des
detenus en vertu de 'article 7 de la Charte en les privant de liberte d'une maniere
arbitraire et trop generale. L'habeas corpus est propose comme un remede possible
au classement inconstitutionnel de securite dans les prisons, conformement a
I'evolution de lajurisprudence relative a I'alinea 10c). Les repercussions des politiques
inconstitutionnelles de classement selon le niveau de securite sur les dispositions
reparatrices de la Loi sur le systeme correctionnel et la mise en liberte sous condition,
soit 'article 81, sont soulignees tout au long du document.
* D'Arcy Leitch, MA, JD Candidate 2019, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. This
paper was awarded first prize in the competition for the 2018 J.S.D. Tory Award for legal writing.
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1. The Security Classification policy violates section 7
a. The deprivation
b. The source of the deprivation
c. The principles offundamentaljustice
2. The policy is not just fied under section ]
a. Limits prescribed by law
b. Justification of limits
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a. The objective of the Community Release policy
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"Truth and Reconciliation Commission ' Call to Action 35: We call upon the federal
government to eliminate barriers to the creation of additional Aboriginal healing lodges
within the federal correctional system."
Introduction
The overrepresentation of First Nations, M~tis, and Inuit people in
Canada's prisons is a crisis that has persisted for decades. The figures
are stark: between 2007 and 2016, the Indigenous prisoner population
increased by 39 percent while the total prisoner population increased by
only 5 percent.1 At the end of 2016, Indigenous men represented 25.2
percent of federal prisoners,2 and Indigenous women represented 36.1
1. The Correctional Investigator Canada, Annual Report: Office of the Correctional Investigator,
2016 2017 (Ottawa: The Correctional Investigator Canada, 2017) at 48, online (pdf): <www.oci-bec.
gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/amrpt/annrpt20162017-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/TS64-FVH8] [OCI 2017].
2. Public Safety Canada, Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview, AnnualReport
2016 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2017) at 53, online (pdf): <www.
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ccrso-2016/ccrso-2016-en.pdf> [perma.cc/Q3J9-J396] [CCRSO
2016].
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percent,3 even though Indigenous peoples represent less than 5 percent
of the Canadian population.4 Historically, these figures are consistent.
Indigenous overrepresentation has increased over the past three decades.5
The crisis continues despite statutory and judicial remedial measures.6
In this paper, I address one remedial measure. In 1992, Parliament
introduced section 81 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,
which aimed to decrease Indigenous overrepresentation in federal prisons
by allowing Indigenous prisoners to serve their sentences in Indigenous
communities or Healing Lodges.7 Unfortunately, section 81 has not been
effective. Indigenous overrepresentation is getting worse, and section
81 agreements remain underutilized, though they offer an important
opportunity to enhance Indigenous community control of prisoners'
sentences.8 Of note, the element of community control has been effective
in promoting successful community reintegration.9
There are several barriers to realizing the intent of section 81,
including underfunding, institutional will, and community acceptance.
10
The most significant barier, however, is Correctional Service Canada's
requirement hat applicants for section 81 transfers have minimum security
3. At this time, Indigenous women are the fastest growing prison population See The Correctional
Investigator Canada, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2014 2015,
(Ottawa: The Correctional Investigator Canada, 2015) at 51, online (pdf): <www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cntl
rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt2Ol42015-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/KR5M-EXK9] [OCI 2015].
4. OCI 2017, supra note 1 at 48.
5. See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the cultural divide: a report on
Aboriginal people and criminal justice in Canada (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1995);
Michael Jackson, "Locking Up Natives in Canada" (1989) 23:2 UBC L Rev 215; OCI 2017, supra
note 1 at 48.
6. See R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385 [Gladue]; R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC
13, [2012] 1 SCR 433; Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20, ss 4(g), 80-84,
151(1),(3) [CCRA]; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.2(e).
7. CCRA, supra note 6, s 81.
8. See Office of the Correctional Investigator, Spirit Matters: Aboriginal People and the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act (Ottawa: Correctional Investigator Canada, 2012) at 17-22, online (pdf):
<www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/oth-aut/oth-aut2Ol21022-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/CS6D-75RE] [Spirit
Matters].
9. For example, the Auditor General of Canada has reported that 78 percent of minimum security
prisoners released from Healing Lodges onparole successfully completed their supervision, against 63
percent of minimum security prisoners released from federal penitentiaries. See Office of the Auditor
General of Canada, Report 3: Preparing Indigenous Prisoners for Release (Ottawa: Office of the
Auditor General of Canada, 2016) at para 3.65, online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl
oag 201611 03 e 41832.html#p63> [ perma.cc/TU7R-U3P9] [Preparing Indigenous Prisoners].
10. Spirit Matters, supra note 8 at 17-22.
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classifications.11 This barier is significant because Indigenous people are
not only overrepresented in prisons, but also overrepresented at higher
security levels within prisons. In 2016, just 16.1 percent of the Indigenous
prisoner population was classified at minimum security, compared to
23.7 percent for non-Indigenous prisoners.2 Further, more Indigenous
prisoners were classified at medium security, at 67.6 percent versus 61.9
percent for non-Indigenous prisoners. Finally, 16.3 percent of Indigenous
prisoners are classified at maximum compared with 14.5 percent of non-
Indigenous prisoners.13 Like Indigenous overrepresentation generally, this
disproportionate classification in 2016 is consistent throughout Canadian
history.1 4 These figures show that the relief offered by section 81 is
limited by the underrepresentation of Indigenous prisoners in minimum-
security. In this paper, I analyze the security classification scheme used by
Correctional Services Canada, and I conclude that it violates the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms.15 By that fact, the limitation of section 81
transfers to minimum security prisoners is illegitimate.
The analysis is organized as follows. In Part I, I argue that the
Correctional Services Canada ("CSC") policythat establishes how prisoners
are assigned security classifications violates section 7 of the Charter.
16
This policy, Commissioner's Directive No 705-7 ("Security Classification
11. Correctional Service Canada policy states that "the offender must be able to be classified as
minimum security or, on a case by case basis, be classified as medium security." Correctional Service
Canada, CCRA Section 81: Transfers, Guideline No 710-2-1, online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/politiques-
et-lois/710-2-1-gl-eng.shtml> [perma.cc/GYP6-3VZU] [GL 710-2-1]. Though the guideline provides
for an individualized assessment of medium security prisoners on "a case by case basis," in practice
this can only be true of female prisoners because all section 81 Healing Lodges for males are minimum
security institutions. So, despite what the policy says on its face, it is reasonable to interpret the
"case by case" language as referring only to female prisoners since there is one Healing Lodge for
women which accepts medium security prisoners. On the other hand, there is nothing in the CCRA that
requires section 81 transferees to serve their sentences in Healing Lodges. In principle, it is possible
for sentences to be administered in Indigenous communities in some other way. In that case, the
case-by-case language may provide for the individual assessment of medium-male prisoners but not
maximum-security prisoners.
12. CCRSO 2016, supra note 2 at 55.
13. Ibid
14. See collection of annual reports "Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview,"
online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cntl/rsrcs/pblctns/index-eaaspx> [perma.cc/SPC9-2GPL]; Canada
Human Rights Commission, Protecting Their Rights: A Systematic Review of Human Rights in
Correctional Servicesfor Federally Sentenced Women (Ottawa: CHRC, December 2003) at 28, online
(pdf): <www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/sites/default/files/fswen.pdf> [perma.cc/923A-WUKD] [CHRC];
Department of the Solicitor General of Canada, Examining Aboriginal Corrections in Canada, by
Carol LaPrairie (Ottawa: DSGC, 1996) at 73, online (pdf): <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cntl/rsrcs/pblctns/
xmnng-brgnl-crrctns/xmnng-brgnl-crrctns-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/QBQ7-H9YY].
15. Canadian Charter of'Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
16. Ibid, ss 7, 15.
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policy") implements section 30(1) of the Corrections and Conditional
Release Act (CCRA). Section 30(1) of the CCRA prescribes that "[t]
he Service shall assign a security classification of maximum, medium or
minimum to each inmate."" I argue that the Security Classification policy
is law for the purposes of Charter review and that it violates section 7 of
the Charter because it mandates the use of an invalid actuarial tool-The
Custody Rating Scale-to assign security classifications. Using CSC's
data, I show that the Custody Rating Scale arbitrarily and systematically
overclassifies Indigenous prisoners into higher security classifications,
diminishing their residual liberty and their likelihood of being paroled,
thereby prolonging their incarceration. I conclude that these effects are
arbitrary and overbroad under section 7 and cannot be justified under
section 1 of the Charter
Another policy, Guideline No 710-2-1 ("Community Release
policy") implements section 81 of CCRA, which, as stated, provides that
Indigenous prisoners can enter into agreements with the Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness for release into the care and custody
of Indigenous communities to serve their sentences.9 In Part II, I argue
that the Community Release policy violates section 7 of the Charter. In
limiting eligibility for section 81 transfers to minimum security prisoners,
the Community Release policy employs the security classifications issued
by the Charter non-compliant Custody Rating Scale (discussed in Part I)
to deny release to a Healing Lodge or Indigenous community.2 I argue
that this limitation is a deprivation of liberty for medium and maximum-
security prisoners under section 7 of the Charter based on an analysis of
recent habeas corpus case law.21 I conclude that those effects are arbitrary
and overbroad. Finally, I argue that arbitrarily assigned CRS classifications
are challengeable by way of habeas corpus.
I. The Security Classification policy
The Security Classification policy requires the use of a statistical instrument
to make security classification recommendations.22 That instrument, the
17. Correctional Service Canada, Security Classification and Penitentiary Placement,
Commissioner's Directive No 705-7, online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/acts-and-regulations/705-7-cd-eng.
shtml> [perma.cc/T7XA-53VL] [CD 705-7].
18. Supra, note 6, s 30(1).
19. GL'710-2-1, supra note 11; CCRA, supra note 6, s 81.
20. GL'710-2-1, supra note 11, atpara 9(a).
21. Section 10(c) of the Charter guarantees that everyone has the right to have the legality of their
detention determined by way of habeas corpus-that is, to petition a court to require the custodian to
prove the lawfulness of the detention.
22. CD 705-7, supra note 17, at paras 10-15.
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Custody Rating Scale ("CRS"), assesses prisoners relative to two distinct
subscales: the Institutional Adjustment Rating Scale (IARS), and the
Security Risk Scale (SRS).23 While both subscales are meant to predict
risk, that construct is operationalized differently for each subscale. The
IARS is meant to measure the likelihood that a prisoner will be involved
in institutional incidents, and therefore also the degree of control and
supervision that prisoner will require within the penitentiary.24 The IARS
correlates risk with five subscale items: number of institutional incidents,
escape history, street stability, alcohol and drug use, and age at the time of
sentencing.25 The SRS, on the other hand, assesses the risk a prisoner poses
to public safety in the event of an escape as a correlate of seven subscale
items: number of prior convictions, most severe outstanding charge,
severity of current charge, sentence length, street stability,26 prior parole/
statutory release, and age at the time of first federal admission.2 Each
subscale item corresponds to a range of potential points, ranging from 0-6
for alcohol and drug use to 12-69 for severity of current charge. Individual
prisoners are assigned points within the range according to their criminal
history or drug use, etc. Point ranges are subdivided into predetermined
possible scores. For example, there are three possible scores for "severity
of current charge": 12, 36, and 69, corresponding to minor or moderate
charges, serious or major charges, or extreme charges. The assigned points
are then summed, and a security classification is assigned according to
cut-off values corresponding to the different security classifications.
2
Essentially, the more points one receives, the more likely one is to be
assigned a higher security classification.
Crucially, if there is a difference between the security classifications
recommended by either of the subscales, the CRS will assign the higher
classification.29 I argue that this critical fact renders the use of the CRS
unconstitutional under section 7. The reason is that the subscales are not
23. Ibid, Annex B, Parts I-II. Although final security classification decisions are made in light of
other assessments and information, such as psychological evaluation and professional judgment, the
CRS recommendation is followed 77 percent of the time, and in the 12 per cent of the cases where it is
not followed, the security rating is increased for Indigenous men. See Correctional Service of Canada,
The Custody Rating Scale as Applied to Male Offenders, by Renee Gobeil (Ottawa: Public Safety
Canada, 2011) at 16, online (pdf): <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn21484-eng.pdf> [perma.
cc/T5AY-VCS9].
24. See CD 705-7, supra note 17, Annex B, Part I.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. "Street stability" refers to factors like education level, employment history, family/
marriage, interpersonal relationships and living arrangements.
27. Ibid, Annex B, Part II.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibidatpara26.
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equally predictive, and the least predictive subscale overwhelmingly
recommends a higher security classification. So, because the CRS assigns
the higher recommended classification, and the least predictive subscale
makes that recommendation, the classification prisoners are ultimately
assigned in the majority of cases does not accurately reflect the risk they
pose to security in the prison. In other words, the CRS overclassifies
prisoners because the least predictive subscale is used to determine the
security classification in the majority of cases.
This is particularly important for Indigenous prisoners. Indigenous
prisoners disproportionately present the characteristics that correspond to
non-predictive individual subscale items, as well as high score ranges for
those items. These subscale items are concentrated in the least predictive
subscale: the subscale that determines the security classification in the
majority of cases. Moreover, several of those items are the most heavily
weighted ofthe subscale items, so a higher score on such an item contributes
significantly to the likelihood of being classified at a high level. I argue that
these facts are legally significant under section 7 of the Charter because
they render the use of the subscale arbitrary and overbroad.
1. The Security Classification policy violates section 7
Section 7 guarantees that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."3" To prove a
section 7 violation, one must show that there is 1) a deprivation of life,
liberty or security of the person that is caused by the state and 2) that
the deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.3 1 I argue that the CRS results in liberty deprivations, is law for the
purposes of Charter scrutiny, and is not in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice that a law must not be arbitrary or overbroad.
a. The deprivation
Security classification results in two kinds of liberty deprivations. The
first relates to the conditions of confinement within the penitentiary and
the second to the length of incarceration. Firstly, minimum, medium,
and maximum security designations correspond to increasing degrees of
30. Charter, supra note 15, s 7.
31. Bedford v Canada, 2013 SCC 72 at paras 58, 78, 93, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].
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restrictiveness within the penitentiary. Freedom of movement and freedom
of association become more limited as security classifications increase.32
Secondly, a prisoner's security classification can result in a longer
incarceration. Studies from the Parole Board of Canada and the Auditor
General of Canada show that prisoners with higher security classifications
are less likely to be granted day or full parole and more likely to be released
at their statutory release date.33 The vast majority of parolees are minimum
security prisoners. The following data can be used to identify these trends.34
Maximum security prisoners returning to community are almost without
exception released at statutory release (two-thirds of sentence). About two-
thirds of medium security prisoners returning to community are released at
their statutory release date, while only ten to twenty percent of minimum
security prisoners tend to be released at their statutory release dates.
2016-2017 2016-2017 2017-2018 2017-2018
Total Total
Actual Sec DAY FULL STAT DAY FULL STAT
Level PAROLE PAROLE PAROLE PAROLE PAROLE RELEASE
MAX. 1 321 322 2 504 506
MED. 463 35 1046 1544 676 32 1801 2509
MIN. 1216 84 160 1460 1670 152 395 2217
Total 1679 120 1527 3326 2348 184 2700 5232
b. The source of the deprivation
To attract Charter protection, a deprivation of liberty must be caused by the
state.35 State action, legislation, or legislative policy is subject to Charter
review.36 Corrections Canada is certainly a government entity for the
purposes ofsection 32 ofthe Charter, andthe Charterappliesto its activities,
including the making of rules and policies. I assume without argument as
32. Correctional Service Canada, Classification of Institutions, Commissioners Directive 706,
online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/lois-et-reglements/706-cd-eng.shtml#E Security Requirements>
[perma.cc/WC96-YFKZ]; Correctional Service Canada, Security Levels and What They Mean, online:
<www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/lt-en/2006/31-2/4-eng.shtml> [perma.cc/S4EJ-H7D9]; OCI 2015,
supra note 3 at 45, 47.]; CHRC, supra note 14.
33. See Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report 6: Preparing Male Prisonersfor Release
Correctional Service Canada (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2015) at paras 6.12-
6.74, online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl oag 201504 06 e 40352.html> [perma.cc/
TC5C-KNK7] [Preparing Male Prisoners]; Preparing Indigenous Prisoners, supra note 3. See also
Parole Board of Canada, Performance Monitoring Reports, online: <www.canada.ca/en/parole-board/
corporate/transparency/reporting-to-canadians/performance-monitoring-report.html> [perma.cc/
N46P-9XPS].
34. Thanks to Marie Kingsley, Executive Director of the Office of the Correctional Investigator, for
sharing this table with me.
35. Charter, supra note 15, s 32(1)(a); RWDSUv Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573 at paras
33-35, 33 DLR (4th) 174 [Dolphin Delivery].
36. Great Vancouver Transport Authority v Canadian Federation of Students British Columbia
Component, 2009 SCC 31 at pam 53, [2009] 2 SCR 295 [GVTA].
Indigenous Overrepresentation and Security Policy 419
in Canadian Federal Penitentiaries
well that the Security Classification Policy causes the liberty deprivations
described above. This standard is a low one, met by a reasonable inference
on the balance of probabilities, and it does not require the law to be the
only source of the deprivation. I take that standard to be met in this case:
the deprivations are a direct consequence of the application of the policy
in issue; but for the policy, they would not exist.3"
c. The principles of fundamental justice
The principles of fundamental justice represent the minimum constitutional
standards that any law must satisfy if it infringes the right to life, liberty, or
security of the person. Since the entrenchment of the Charter, the Supreme
Court has articulated both substantive and procedural protections of life,
liberty, and security of the person as principles of fundamental justice.3"
The former are related to the content or character of laws and the latter to
the demands of fairness in legal procedure.39 My argument relies on the
former: the principles that any law that violates section 7 rights must not
be arbitrary or overbroad.
4
1
Arbitrariness and overbreadth are purpose-based, relational norms that
concern the relationship between the objective of the law and its effects.
41
If a law infringes life, liberty, or security of the person, the principles
demand that that effect must not be arbitrarily related to the objective of
the law. In other words, the rights-infringing effects must be rationally
connected to the objective. That is the minimal constitutional standard that
liberty-infringing laws must satisfy.42 Where there is no rational connection
between the objective of the law and its effects, the law is arbitrary because
the rights-infringing effects are unnecessary for, or inconsistent with, the
law's objective.43 Overbroad laws are arbitrary in part, in that some of the
law's effects are not rationally connected to the law's objective.
44
The effectiveness of the law or whether it is on balance a good one
for society are not relevant questions under section 7: "[t]he analysis is
qualitative, not quantitative. The question under s. 7 is whether anyone s
37. Bedford, supra note 31 at paras 75-76.
38. I note that more than the two principles of fundamental justice that I consider could be applicable
in this context. However, they are beyond the scope of this paper. For other principles of fundamental
justice, see Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 6th ed (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2017).
39. Ibid, chapter 13.
40. R v Moriarity, 2015 SCC 55 at para 24, [2015] 3 SCR 485 [Moriarity]; Bedford, supra note 31
at paras 93-119.
41. Bedford, supra note 31 atpara 111.
42. Ibid
43. Ibidatparas 118-119.
44. Ibidatparas 111, 113.
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life, liberty or security of the person has been denied by a law that is
inherently bad... [an] overbroad, or arbitrary effect on one person is
sufficient to establish a breach of s. 7.""
To test for arbitrariness and overbreadth, the law's objective and effects
must be compared. The analysis begins by identifying the objective.46
Precision is required because arbitrariness and overbreadth are objective-
dependent, so if the purpose of the law is conceived too broadly, it becomes
easy to rationally connect the purpose to the effects. Conversely, if the
purpose of the law is conceived too narrowly, it becomes harder to identify
a rational connection between the purpose and effects:
47
[t]he appropriate level of generality, therefore, resides between the
statement of an "animating social value"-which is too general-and
a narrow articulation, which can include a virtual repetition of the
challenged provision, divorced from its context-which risks being too
specific... [t]he statement of purpose should generally be both a precise
and succinct., articulations of the law's objective.48
The analysis assumes that the objective is both "lawful and appropriate,"49
and that it must be identified in its full context. To that end, the text, the
context, and scheme of the Act are all relevant."
The objective of the Security Classification policy must therefore be
determined in light of the overall objectives of the CCRA and the particular
purpose of the policy itself. The CCRA states that the fundamental objective
of all correctional policy is to carry out sentences in a safe and humane
fashion, and to assist with the rehabilitation and community reintegration
of prisoners through the provision of programs in penitentiaries and in
the community.1 The CCRA further states that the protection of society
is the paramount consideration i the provision of correctional services.2
Section 4 identifies the principles that must guide the CSC in administering
the CCRA k3 Most pertinent are the requirements that the CSC only use
relevant information in decision making, that only the least restrictive
45. Ibidat para 123.
46. Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para 73, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter];
Bedford, supra note 31 at para 123. Note: I interchangeably use "objective," "purpose," and "goal" in
this paper.
47. Carter, supra note 46 at para 77.
48. Moriarity, supra note 40 at paras 28-29.
49. Ibid at para 30.
50. Ibidatpara 31.
51. Supra note 6, s 3.
52. Ibid, s 3.1.
53. Ibid, s 4.
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measures necessary be used, and that the CSC respond to the unique needs
of Indigenous prisoners .
5 4
The purpose of the Security Classification policy is to determine
prisoners' security classification and penitentiary placement, while having
regard to the overall objective of the CCRA and its guiding principles.
Equally, the distinct objective of the CRS must be understood in this
context. It is reasonable to assume that the CSC introduced the scale
-an objective, statistical instrument-to eliminate subjectivity from
the classification process, to ensure that the appropriate restrictions are
imposed on prisoners while ensuring safety to the public, and staff and
prisoners within the institution. Indeed, this is apparent from the logical
framework of the CRS. The scale attempts to predict the likelihood of
institutional incidents and returns to custody for the further purpose of
assigning the correct security classification. In other words, the purpose
of the Security Classification policy is to ensure safety by assigning a
security classification that is proportionate to predicted risk.55 That is why
risk is measured in the first place. This is the objective against which the
effects are to be compared.
The effects of the Security Classification policy on Indigenous
prisoners are well documented." As previously outlined, Indigenous
prisoners are disproportionately represented at higher security levels. Put
simply, the effect of the CRS is to cause Indigenous overclassification
and the associated liberty deprivations, both in terms of conditions of
confinement and length of incarceration. If these effects are unnecessary
for, or inconsistent with, the objectives of the Security Classification
policy and the CRS, having regard to the overall purpose of the CCRA and
its guiding principles, it is arbitrary or overbroad for some prisoners.
Arbitrariness and overbreadth are both concerned with the disconnect
between the objective of the law and its effects. The required analysis
compares the purpose of the adopted measure with what it actually
does by asking whether and to what extent the effects of the chosen
measure advance its purpose, or whether the rights-infringing effects are
unnecessary or inconsistent with that purpose." I compare the objective of
the Security Classification policy and the CRS with the identified effects.
In each case, I conclude that the effects are either arbitrary or overbroad.
54. Ibid, ss 4(a), (c), (g).
55. CDO 705-7, supra note 17, Annex A.
56. CCRSO 2016, supra note 2.
57. Moriarity, supra note 40 at paras 24, 27.
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Whether there is a disconnect between the objective of the CRS and
the effect of overclassification is equivalent to the following question: are
Indigenous prisoners accurately classified at higher security levels? In
other words, are Indigenous prisoners overrepresented at higher security
levels because they are in fact higher risk prisoners who require more
control and supervision? The latter question is just to ask: does the CRS
fulfill its purpose of measuring risk and correlating it with security levels?
That is, is it a valid tool? Does it measure what it is supposed to measure
(risk as a function of the individual subscale items)? Data from a recent
CSC study shows that the answer to these questions i no.
It is important to note that the section 7 analysis does not ultimately
assess the wisdom or effectiveness of the law." The means chosen by the
state to achieve an objective are not for the courts to assess: the usefulness,
accuracy or ability of the CRS to achieve its goal is not in itself material to
the analysis. What is relevant to the constitutional analysis is whether, in
attempting to achieve its goal, the CRS has caused arbitrary or overbroad
effects on Indigenous prisoners by depriving them of liberty in a manner
that is not rationally connected to the goal of using the CRS. Thus, although
I will show that the CRS is an invalid and flawed tool, that alone does not
make it unconstitutional. The point is that in applying it, some Indigenous
prisoners who pose a low risk to safety are deprived of their liberty by
being classified as medium when they ought to be classified as minimum,
or as maximum when they ought to be classified as minimum or medium,
and that these effects are not rationally connected to the objective of the
CRS. They are thus arbitrary and overbroad for some prisoners.
In response to academic, empirical, and institutional critique of the
CRS, the CSC undertook to validate the tool.59 A 2011 study concluded
that it is valid for security classification purposes." The notion of validity
the tool is taken to satisfy is that of discrimination validity. The tool
accurately discriminates between minimum, medium, and maximum
security classification in terms of increasing proportions of institutional
incidents and returns to custody-the operationalized outcomes of risk
58. Ibid at para 30; Carter, supra note 46 at para 79; Bedford, supra note 31 at para 123.
59. See, e.g., Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N Doob, "Classification without Validity or Equity:
An Empirical Examination of the Custody Rating Scale for Federally Sentenced Women Prisoners
in Canada" (2004) 46:4 Can J Criminology & Crim Justice 395 [Webster & Doob, "Classification
without Validity"]; Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N Doob, "'Taking Down the Straw Man'
or Building a House of Straw? Validity, Equity, and the Custody Rating Scale" (2004) 46:5 Can J
Criminology & Crim Justice 631; Gobeil, supra note 23.
60. Gobeil, supra note 23.
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that the scale is meant to predict.61 Institutional incidents and returns to
custody do increase as a function of security classification levels-there
are fewer incidents at minimum than at medium or maximum security.
However, the CRS remains defective in terms of its predictive validity
for Indigenous prisoners.62 This fact is legally significant. To be Charter
compliant, I argue that the CRS must be both valid in terms of the
predictions it makes and in terms of its capacity to discriminate between
classifications, because without predictive validity the CRS produces
arbitrary liberty infringements.
The following comparison of the predictive validity of each subscale
demonstrates that for a hypothetical prisoner, it is reasonably foreseeable
that their security classification is going to be increased from minimum to
medium security or above on arbitrary grounds because of the contribution
in points from non-predictive subscale items. So notwithstanding whatever
predictive validity the scale as a whole may have, the inclusion of non-
predictive subscale items might nevertheless mean the difference between
minimum, medium or maximum security for a given individual prisoner.
That is the problem.
Table 1, 2, and 3 show the extent of the association between the
individual subscale items and the predicted outcomes. The Security Risk
subscale is the least predictive of the subscales for Indigenous prisoners
for each of the outcomes of interest because fewer of its subscale items
are statistically significant. Of note, two of the most heavily weighted
items are not statistically significant. As of 2011, 5 of the 7 scale items
did not predict: there was no statistically significant correlation between
5 individual scale items and the outcomes of interest. Street stability and
age at first federal admission did predict. But number of prior convictions,
most significant outstanding charge, severity of current charge, sentence
length, and prior parole/statutory release did not predict involvement in
institutional incidents or charges.
Not only do these items not predict, but Indigenous prisoners
disproportionately present those very characteristics that then qualify
61. Ibid at 20. This fact appears to be the basis upon which the CSC concludes that CRS is valid:
for Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders, the rate of involvement in minor and major incidents
increased linearly with security classification, both when CRS recommendations and actual security
classification were considered.
62. In fact, the tool is also invalid for non-Indigenous prisoners but less so as can be seen from the
data below.
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them as higher risk on what are in fact non-predictive criteria.63 The
characteristics that Indigenous prisoners are more likely to present are
itemized under the most heavily weighted criteria (see Table 4 and 5), such
as severity of current charge, which are negatively correlated with some of
the outcomes of interest.
The Correctional Investigator has reported that compared to non-
Indigenous prisoners, Indigenous inmates are more likely to present
a history of drug and alcohol use and addictions, more likely to be
incarcerated for a violent offence, and more likely to have served previous
youth and/or adult sentences.64
Table 1. Association of CRS Items and Conviction of Institutional Charges
6 5
Extent of Association (r,)
66
Aboriginal Non-Aboriginal
CRS Items Minor Serious Minor Serious
Charge Charge Charge Charge
Security Risk Subscale
Number of prior convictions .07 .02 .04 .06*
Most serious outstanding charge .03 .05 .06** .09**
Severity of current charge .03 .03 .10** .03
Sentence length .01 .00 .08** .05*
Street stability .10** .08* .11** .11**
Prior parole/ statutory release .01 .04 .04* .06**
63. CCRSO 2016, supra note 2 at 62. Compare the following differences between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous prisoners:
A greater proportion of Indigenous prisoners than non-Indigenous prisoners were serving
a sentence for a Schedule I offence (60.1% versus 45.7%, respectively): Schedule I is
comprised of sexual offences and other violent crimes excluding first and second-degree
murder.
Schedule II is comprised of serious drug offences or conspiracy to commit serious drug
offences.
9.9% of Indigenous prisoners were serving a sentence for a Schedule II offence compared
to 20.4% of non-Indigenous offenders.
At the end of fiscal year 2015-2016, there were a total of 3,591 prisoners in custody with
a life/indeterminate sentence. Of these, 3,465 (9 6.5%) were men and 126 (3 .5%) were
women; 900 (25.1%) were Indigenous and 2,691 (74.9%) were non-Indigenous.
At the end of the fiscal year 2015-2016, Indigenous prisoners were more likely to be
serving a sentence for a violent offence (78.2% for Indigenous versus 45.7% for non-
Indigenous; 71. 9% of Indigenous women prisoners were serving a sentence for a violent
offence compared to 46.3% of non-Indigenous women offender; of those serving a sentence
for Murder, 4.5% were women and 20.5 were Indigenous."
64. OCI 2015, supra note 3 at 37.
65. Gobeil supra note 23 at 50.
66. Phi (0) is a statisticalmeasure of strength of correlation. Its range extends from 0.00 to 1.00. The
former signifies no relationship, while the latter signifies a perfect relationship.
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Age at first federal admission .18** .19** .15** .21"*
Institutional Adjustment Subscale
History of institutional incidents .15** .14** .6** .14*
Escape history .05 .06 .03 .06**
Street stability .10** .09** .11** .11**
Alcohol/drug use .03 .04 .09** .09**
Age at time of sentence .20** .20** .15** .21"*
Note: *p<.001(equivalent o p<.05 after application of Bonferroni correction). **p<.0002 (equivalent
to p<.01 after application of Bonferroni correction)
Table 2. Association of CRS Items and Involvement in Institutional Incidents
6 7
Extent of Association (r.)
Aboriginal Non-Aboriginal
CRS Items Minor Major Minor Major
Incident Incident Incident Incident
Security Risk Subscale
Number of prior convictions .06 .02 .09** .07**
Most serious outstanding .07 .03 .07** .07**
charge
Severity of current charge .02 .00 .03 .01
Sentence length .00 .02 .02 .02
Street stability .08* .02** .08** .08**
Prior parole/ statutory release .07 .02 .05* .04
Age at first federal admission .12** .13** .13"* .17"*
Institutional Adjustment
Subscale
History of institutional .17** .15"* .13** .12**
incidents
Escape history .12** .09* .07** .05**
Street stability .08* .10** .08** .09**
Alcohol/drug use .05 .05 .05** .08**
Age at time of sentence .12** .17** .13** .18*
67. Gobeil, supra note 23 at 49.
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Table 3. Association of CRS Items and Returns to Custody68
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Table 4. Distribution of High and Low Scores on CRS Items69
Percentage of Scores
Aboriginal Non-Aboriginal
CRS Items Low High Low High
Security Risk Subscale
Number of prior convictions 49 51 59 41
Most serious outstanding charge 78 22 80 20
Severity of current charge 31 69 39 61
Sentence length 79 21 76 24
Street stability 41 59 60 40
Prior parole/ statutory release 48 52 56 44
Age at first federal admission 40 60 52 48
68. Ibidat 52.
69. Ibid at 14.
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Institutional Adjustment Subscale
History of institutional incidents 33 67 39 61
Escape history 75 25 85 15
Street stability 42 58 62 39
Alcohol/drug use 29 71 54 46
Age at time of sentence 49 51 62 38




Number of prior convictions 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15
Most serious outstanding charge 0, 12, 15, 25, 35
Severity of current charge 12, 36, 69
Sentence length 5, 20, 45, 65
Street stability 0, 5, 10, 20
Prior parole/ statutory release 0 -21
Age at first federal admission 0 -30
Institutional Adjustment Subscale
History of institutional incidents 0 -11
Escape history 0, 4, 12, 20, 20
Street stability 0, 16, 32
Alcohol/drug use 0, 3, 6
Age at time of sentence 0-24
The Institutional Adjustment subscale is more predictive than the
Security Risk subscale because a greater ratio of its subscale items are
statistically significant. For Indigenous inmates, between 2 and 4 of the
5 subscale items-depending on the outcome being measured-were
predictive: history of institutional incidents, escape history, street stability,
and age at time of sentencing. However, alcohol and drug use did not
predict involvement in institutional incidents or conviction for institutional
charges (Table 1 and 2), and there was no statistically significant
relationship between escape history and conviction for institutional charges
either (Table 1). The fact that the Security Risk subscale is less predictive
is significant because, as discussed above, where there is a difference in
security classification recommendations between the two subscales, the
70. CD 705-7, supra note 17.
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scale which recommends the higher classification will determine the final
security classification.
71
In the CSC's 2011 study, the author states: "[a]s mentioned, the two
subscales produce independent security classification recommendations,
and the actual CRS security classification recommendation corresponds
to the higher of these" and cites CSC's security classification policy,
Commissioner's Directive 705-7.72 The claim quoted above is not
explicitly made in that directive, but I suppose it follows by implication
from the Security Classification policy's conjunctive definition of the
security levels: minimum security is defined as between 0 to 85 on the
institutional adjustment subscale AND between 0 to 63 on the Security
Risk subscale; medium is defined as between 86 and 94 on the Institutional
Adjustment subscale AND between 0 to 133 on the Security Risk
subscale or between 0 and 85 on the Institutional Adjustment subscale
AND between 64 and 133 on the Security risk subscale; and maximum is
defined as 95 or greater on the Institutional Adjustment subscale or 134 or
greater on the security risk subscale. Accordingly, a prisoner who receives
both a 78 on the Institutional Adjustment Subscale receives a minimum
security recommendation on that subscale, and a 64 on the Security Risk
Subscale receives a medium security on that subscale, and will therefore
be categorized by the CRS as medium security.
73
This result is critical because the Security Risk subscale-i.e., the
least predictive subscale-overwhelmingly recommends a higher security
classification. Data from the CSC's 2011 study shows that the Institutional
Adjustment subscale recommended aminimum-security classification in 78
percent of assignments, whereas the Security Risk subscale recommended
minimum security in only 19 percent of the cases, and medium security in
78 percent of cases.74 That means the overall CRS recommendation could
only be minimum security in 19 percent of the cases, and therefore the less
predictive subscale overwhelmingly determined security classification.
71. Subject to a discretionary override (CD 705-7, supra note 17). I note that this is data about male
prisoners, so the conclusions I draw are not necessarily applicable to female Indigenous prisoners. The
CSC has undertaken a revalidation of the CRS for women offenders, but it is not publicly available,
and I have not received it at the time of writing. See online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/005008-
0273-eng.shtml> [perma.cc/SSD8-F9MJ]. See Webster & Doob, "Classification without Validity,"
supra note 59 for an empirical critique of the CRS and women prisoners. The authors identify the
same problems of predictive validity as are found above, but they do not frame those findings within
a Charter analysis.
72. Gobeil, supra note 23 at 15.
73. CD 705-7, supra note 17 at para 26.
74. Gobeil, supra note 23 at 15.
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The legal consequence is that the CRS is overbroad. It classifies some
prisoners as medium-security when they ought not to be classified as
such-given the purpose of the classification scheme-because the more
predictive subscale recommends minimum security. The same is true,
mutatis mutandis, for maximum security classifications.5 That means that
the effect of these classifications is arbitrary because the purpose of the
CRS is to assign security classifications based on predicted risk. In other
words, if the objective of the CRS is to predict risk in order to assign
a security classification that is proportionate to that risk, then the CRS
should assign a minimum-security classification where the predicted risk
is minimal. If the predicted risk is minimal, it would be arbitrary to assign a
medium security classification. Yet that is exactly what the CRS does when
the Institutional Adjustment subscale recommends minimum security, but
the Security Risk subscale recommends medium security. The liberty
deprivations caused by assigning medium security classifications in those
cases are therefore arbitrary because they are unnecessary for the objective
of ensuring safety, given that the more predictive subscale predicts safety
is ensured at a minimum-security classification.6
To sum up: Indigenous prisoners are being arbitrarily classified
because they are scoring points on the Security Risk Subscale for subscale
items that have no predictive value.22 And because Indigenous prisoners
are more likely to present the characteristics that correspond to those
subscale items, and several of those items are the most heavily weighted
under the scheme, the inclusion of those items in the Security Risk subscale
disproportionately impacts Indigenous prisoners. The more predictive
subscale-the Institutional Adjustment Subscale-is not used to assign
75. I note that the more predictive subscale more frequently recommends maximum than the
Security Risk subscale. See Ibid. However, it is possible to construct a reasonable hypothetical under
which an individual prisoner scores the maximum points for the most heavily weighted subscale items
(sentence length and severity of current charge) under the Security Risk subscale, and will therefore
automatically spend 2 years (recall security classifications are re-assessed at two year intervals) at a
maximum-security classification, despite the fact that these items are the least predictive of risk. That
is arbitrary for the purposes of section 7.
76. The same point holds, mutatis mutandis, for maximum-security prisoners.
77. Of course, if the Institutional Adjustment subscale were to recommend medium and the Security
Risk subscale were to recommend minimum for a given prisoner, the liberty restriction would be less
arbitrary. However, the result could still be arbitrary because the Institutional Adjustment subscale
is non-predictive for alcohol and drug use-that means that for a given prisoner, their security
classification could be elevated from minimum to medium on the more predictive subscale because of
a non-predictive item. That is arbitrary, and the effect is also arbitrary for the purposes of the Charter
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security classifications in many cases." Thus, in those cases, the liberty
deprivations caused by the security classifications are arbitrary given the
purpose of classifying prisoners in terms of the risk they pose as measured
by the likelihood that they will engage in institutional misconduct or be
returned to custody. Because of the conjunctive definition of the security
classification under the Security Classification policy, the least predictive
subscale determines classification. Indigenous prisoners are in some
cases going to be classified as medium where they do not pose a medium
security level of risk, or maximum where the risk they pose is not maximal.
These effects are also inconsistent with the statutory objectives of using
measures that are limited to what is necessary and proportionate to attain
the purposes of the Act, having regard to all relevant information."
2. The policy is not justified under section ]
The limitations clause of the Charter grants the state the opportunity to
prove that the Charter breach is justified. The question under section 1
is: are the limitations on the section 7 rights reasonable and can they be
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"?
80
In order to be saved under section 1, the impugned policy must be
prescribed by law, and justified under the Oakes framework: the policy
must be motivated by a pressing and substantial objective, it must be
rationally connected to its effects, it must be minimally impairing, and its
deleterious effects must be proportionate to its salutary ones.81 I conclude
that the Security Classification policy is prescribed by law and is motivated
by a pressing and substantial objective, but it is not rationally connected to
its rights-infringing effects and is not minimally impairing.
a. Limits prescribed by law
The Security Classification policy is prescribed by law if it is both law
and prescribed. The law requirement is satisfied if the policy was properly
enacted under the authority of a government entity empowered by statute
to make policy, and if the policy is one of binding application. The
78. Note: a key difference between the facts and analysis I have laid out above and those from the
recent SCC decision in Ewert v Canada, 2018 SCC 30. In Ewert, the Court was not prepared to find
that CSC's use of psychological assessment tools that are not known to be reliable for Indigenous
prisoners violated the Charter, even where those assessments were considered by Corrections officials
for the purposes of reclassification and the granting of parole, etc. The CRS is different. I am not
arguing that it is not known to be reliable, but that it is known to be unreliable. So the argument is
much stronger.
79. For example, a "medium security" designation will not be relevant for the purposes of
penitentiary placement in any cases where it is assigned as a result of the contribution in points from
non-predictive subscale items.
80. Charter, supra note 15, s 1.
81. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at paras 69-71, 26 DLR (4th) 200 [Oakes].
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prescribed requirement is satisfied if the policy is "sufficiently accessible
and precise":"
So long as the enabling legislation allows the entity to adopt binding
rules, and so long as the mles establish rights and obligations of general
rather than specific application.. .they will qualify as "law" which
prescribes a limit on a Charter right.83
The policy is law for the purposes of section 1.84 Parliament has
delegated to the Commissioner rule-making authority under the CCRA
and CCRR, and the policy made under that authority is binding on those to
whom it applies.85 Staff must use the CRS to assign a security classification
to all incoming prisoners." The policy establishes prisoner's rights and
obligations by creating different liberty restrictions corresponding to the
different security classifications. Accessibility is required by the CCRA,
and the policy is in fact accessible to staff, prisoners, and the public.8
Moreover, the CRS itself is precise because it is an actuarial tool. It was
introduced for the very purpose of reducing discretionary decision making
and increasing predictability and certainty by removing human subjectivity
from the decision-making process."
b. Justification of limits
Pressing and substantial objective
This section 1 requirement is satisfied where the objective of the law
is of sufficiently great societal importance to "warrant overriding a
constitutional right or freedom."9 The objective that must be identified is
that of the measures which cause the limitation on the Charter right.90 The
impugned measure is the CRS and Security Classification policy.
Having already outlined the objective of the Security Classification
policy and the CRS above, I repeat only the most relevant guiding
82. GVTA, supra note 36 at para 64.
83. Ibid.
84. I am adopting this argument from Adelina Iftene, "Employing Older Prisoner Empirical
Data to Test a Novel s 7 Charter Claim" (2017) 40:2 Dal LJ 1, where the author argues that certain
Commissioner's Directives are prescribed by law for the purposes of section 1, as here, but also for the
purposes of section 7.
85. CCRA, supra note 6, s 97, 98.
86. CD 705-7, supra note 17 at paras 24-28.
87. CCRA, supra note 6, s 98(2) requires Commissioner's Directives to be accessible to prisoners,
staff members, and the public.
88. See Correctional Service of Canada (Research Branch), Security Classification Using the
Custody Rating Scale, by Brian A Grant & Fred Luciani (Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada,
February 1998), online (pdf): <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/092/r67 e.pdf> [perma.cc/5AGX-KR5J].
89. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 atpara 139, 18 DLR (4th) 321.
90. Oakes, supra note 81 at para 73.
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principles: section 4(a) states that the sentence is to be carried out having
regard to all relevant information; 4(c) states that the CSC "uses measures
that are consistent with the protection of society, staff members and
prisoners and that are limited to only what is necessary and proportionate
to attain the purposes of the Act"; and section 4(g) states that "correctional
policies, programs and practices respect gender, ethnic, cultural and
linguistic differences and are responsive to the special needs of women,
aboriginal peoples, persons requiring mental health care and other
groups."9 1 The specific objective of the CRS "to determine the inmates
security classification and penitentiary placement"92 must be interpreted
in this context. I conclude that accurately classifying prisoners for the
purposes of the CCRA is a pressing and substantial societal objective.
Rational connection
The objective of the CRS is not rationally connected to its effects because its
effects are arbitrary. The CRS is supposed to determine two things: (1) the
degree of supervision and control a prisoner requires within the penitentiary
and (2) the probability of escape and the risk to public safety in the event of
an escape.93 The CSC has decided that a determination of (1) is equivalent
to a prediction of involvement in institutional incidents and conviction
of serious institutional charges. A determination of (2) is equivalent to a
prediction of the likelihood that a prisoner will be returned to custody. The
CRS, however, is not predictive of either outcome for Indigenous prisoners
because there is no significant relationship between most of the scale items
and the outcomes the Security Risk subscale measures, yet the Security
Risk subscale frequently determines security classification because of
how the Security Classification policy defines minimum, medium, and
maximum security. This means that some Indigenous prisoners are being
placed into higher security levels for arbitrary reasons. If the purpose is
to make accurate predictions about prisoner involvement in institutional
and social misconduct to assign an appropriate security classification, it is
irrational to rely on inaccurate information for that purpose and to classify
prisoners who pose a minimum security risk as medium security.
9 4
Furthermore, an effect of a policy which directly contradicts the
statutory objectives of the Act that the policy implements cannot be
91. CCRA, supra note 6, ss 4(a), (c), (g) [emphasis added].
92. See the statement of purpose of CD 705-7, supra note 17.
93. Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/96-602, s 18 [CCRR].
94. Similar reasonable hypotheticals can be made involving maximum security prisoners. For
example, a prisoner who scores few to no points on the most predictive items, but, due to the severity
of their charge and the length of their sentence (the least predictive subscales), they will automatically
be classified as maximum security.
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rationally connected to its effects.95 The CCRA requires that sentences be
administered using measures that are limited to only what is necessary
and proportionate to the purposes of the Act, having regard to all relevant
information. The information on which the CRS relies in classifying
Indigenous prisoners-the points associated with scale items and the
non-predictive scale items themselves-are in many cases going to be
irrelevant for the purposes of classification because that information has no
predictive value. This results in the imposition of restrictions that are not
necessary and disproportionate. I conclude that the Security Classification
policy is therefore not rationally connected to its effects.
97
Minimal impairment
The CRS is not minimally impairing. Less impairing measures can be
easily envisioned. For example, if the final security designation were
determined by the most predictive subscale instead of the subscale that
recommends the higher security classification, the policy would be less
impairing than it currently is. Alternatively, the scales could be combined,
or the non-predictive subscale items could be removed. The policy
therefore cannot be justified under section 1.98 A prisoner will therefore
be able to challenge a security classification determined in this manner by
way of habeas corpus, as discussed below.
II. The Community Release policy
The Community Release policy establishes the eligibility criteria for a
section 81 transfer of a prisoner into the care and custody of an Indigenous
community to serve their sentence. The policy restricts eligibility to
minimum-security prisoners, or, on a case-by-case basis, medium-security
female prisoners.99 If a maximum-security prisoner were to apply, they
95. VriendvAlberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 atparas 118-119, 156 DLR (4th) 385.
96. Supra, note 6, ss 4(a)-(c).
97. See also R v Chambers, 2014 YKCA 13 at para 74, 316 CCC (3d) 44; Hitzig v R, 177 OAC
321 at para 115, 231 DLR (4th) 104. These two appellate cases held that the proposition that the
state must obey the law is a principle of fundamental justice. Where a policy directly contravenes the
law proclaimed by Parliament and in that process violates liberty, that violation cannot have been in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
98. I note that the policy cannot be saved by the fact that it allows for a discretionary override of
the presumptive classification determined by the CRS. It may not be contended that where the initial
CRS-determined security classification is inappropriate (as a result of the contribution in points from
non-predictive subscale items), a Charter infringement can be avoided because that determination
can be overridden at the discretion of a corrections official. Unconstitutional laws are null and void
under section 52 of the Constitution Act and cannot be made constitutional on a case-by-case basis
depending on how administrators apply it, and bad policy "fixed up" on a case-by-case basis by
corrections officials is not preferred by public policy. For a discussion of these points in a different
context, seeR vNur, 2015 SCC 15, at paras 85-91, [2015] 1 SCR 773.
99. GL710-2-1, supra note 11.
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would automatically be denied, whereas medium-security prisoners may
benefit from individual assessment. By employing the unconstitutionally
assigned security classifications discussed in Part I, the Community
Release policy violates section 7. Where a prisoner is denied an application
based on their security status, and their security status has been determined
by the CRS in the Charter non-compliant way illustrated above, I argue
that they could challenge that classification under habeas corpus under
section 10(c) of the Charter."' More generally however, a prisoner should
be able to challenge by way of habeas corpus any security classification
that results from the contribution in points from non-predictive subscale
items.
1. The Community Release policy violates section 7 and habeas corpus
should lie to challenge unconstitutional security classifications
In Dumas, Lamer CJ identified three types of liberty deprivations: "[i]n
the context of correctional law, there are three different deprivations of
liberty: the initial deprivation of liberty, a substantial change in conditions
amounting to a further deprivation of liberty, and a continuation of the
initial deprivation of liberty."10 1 Though Lamer CJ confined his analysis
to habeas corpus applications, the principles should be applicable under
section 7102
The liberty deprivation resulting from the Community Release policy
falls under the third type. The policy causes a continuation of the initial
deprivation of a prisoner's liberty by restricting the application of section
81 of the CCRA.103 While section 81 of the CCRA grants Indigenous
prisoners a conditional opportunity to serve their sentence in the care and
custody of an Indigenous community, the Community Release policy
infringes liberty by taking that opportunity away.
Section 81 does not contain any restrictive language-on a plain
reading, any Indigenous prisoner is eligible to request a transfer.
However, by imposing a minimum-security classification requirement,
the Community Release policy makes 84 percent of Indigenous prisoners
100. Charter, supra note 15, s 10(c): Everyone has the right to have the legality of their detention
determined by way of habeas corpus. Of course, any arbitrary classification by the CRS could also be
challenged.
101. Dumas v Leclerc Institute, [1986] 2 SCR 459 at para 12, 34 DLR (4th) 427 [Dumas] [emphasis
added].
102. I cannot see any reason in principle why a liberty deprivation for the purpose of one would not
amount to the same for the other.
103. Supra note 6, s 81: The Minister, or a person authorized by the Minister, may enter into an
agreement with an aboriginal community for the provision of correctional services to aboriginal
prisoners and for payment by the Minister, or by a person authorized by the Minister, in respect of the
provision of those services.
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ineligible for a transfer.114 This is a consequence of the fact that the CSC
has structured section 81 agreements such that in almost every case where
a transfer is made, the prisoner is transferred to a Healing Lodge, which
are minimum security institutions.0 5 Eighty-four percent of Indigenous
prisoners are therefore faced with a continuation of their initial liberty
deprivation. This engages sections 7 and 10(c) of the Charter.
Within the habeas corpus jurisprudence, however, there is a line of
cases that hold that a continuation of an initial deprivation of liberty is not
a deprivation of liberty challengeable by way of habeas corpus. Because
I am arguing for the applicability of the types of liberty deprivations
identified in Dumas-a habeas corpus case-to the section 7 context, this
line of cases must be addressed.
These cases are generally of two types, the first being involuntary
transfers of prisoners to penitentiaries of the same security classification.
These are referred to as lateral transfers because the conditions i  each
institution are equally restrictive. The second type are cases where
a prisoner applies to be reclassified at a lower security status-from
maximum to medium or from medium to minimum-and the application
is denied.
The courts have analyzed whether there is a deprivation of liberty
in either of these scenarios. The leading case among those which hold
that there is not is LVR.0 6 In that case, a prisoner ("LVR") was initially
classified at a maximum-security level and imprisoned at the Regional
Reception Assessment Center, a maximum-security penitentiary in
Matsqui Institution, British Columbia. He was subsequently reclassified
as a medium security prisoner and transferred to Mountain Institution, a
medium security penitentiary. LVR applied to be reclassified as minimum
security and sought to be transferred to a minimum-security institution. The
application was denied.1 7 LVR challenged that decision by way of habeas
corpus, which he combined with claims under section 7 of the Charter,
alleging an absence of procedural fairness and unreasonableness.0 8
The chambers judge found that habeas corpus could not lie to challenge
the reclassification decision.0 9 The chambers judge relied on Mapara,
which held that a Warden's decision not to grant an application for an
104. Eighty-four percent of Indigenous prisoners are classified as medium-security or above.
105. See Correctional Service Canada, Correctional Service Canada Healing Lodges, online: <www.
csc-scc.gc.ca/aboriginal/002003-2000-eng.shtml> [perma.cc/AZ3B-4XZZ].
106. LVR v Mountain Institution (Warden), 2016 BCCA 467, 346 CCC (3d) 254 [LVR].
107. Ibid at para 3.
108. Ibid at paras 1, 11.
109. Ibid at paras 7-8.
436 The Dalhousie Law Journal
escorted temporary absence did not constitute a deprivation of liberty for
the purposes of habeas corpus because that decision did not result in a
change in the applicant's conditions of confinement.11 Likewise, because
LVR's classification status remained at medium security and the conditions
of his confinement had not changed, the chambers judge reasoned that
there was no diminution of LVR's residual liberty.
111
This reasoning was upheld on appeal. Stromberg-Stein JA, for the
British Columbia Court of Appeal applied the leading habeas corpus case,
Khela:...
Khela does not seek to exhaustively list the types of decisions that could
constitute a deprivation of residual liberty, but the examples listed in
Khela at para. 34 all reflect decisions that would increase the restrictions
of an inmate's residual liberty. Thus, an initial classification decision
following a valid committal or a decision denying a transfer to a lower
security facility would not be decisions that constitute a deprivation of
residual liberty for the purposes of habeas corpus 113
The part of paragraph 34 of Khela that Stromberg-Stein JA is referring
to reads: "[d]ecisions which might affect an offender's residual liberty
include, but are not limited to, administrative segregation, confinement
in a special handling unit and, as in the case at bar, a transfer to a higher
security institution.11114 Each of these are examples of the second type
of liberty deprivation identified in Dumas (a substantial change in the
conditions of detention).
However, the quotation from Stromberg-Stein JA contains a non
sequitur It is not valid to reason that decisions that result in the continuation
of the initial deprivation of liberty do not constitute deprivations for the
purpose of habeas corpus because decisions that increase restrictions
on inmates' residual liberty do constitute deprivations of liberty for the
purpose of habeas corpus. That would be to reason that because there are
deprivations of liberty of the second type identified in Dumas, there are
not deprivations of the third type.
I suggest hat the error in Stromberg-Stein JA's reasons lies in failing
to take account of the implications of Khela for Dumas. Khela expanded
the availability of habeas corpus. Prior to Khela, the test for habeas
corpus consisted in showing 1) a deprivation of liberty, the onus for which
lay with the applicant; and 2) that the deprivation is lawful, the onus
110. Mapara v Ferndale Institution, 2012 BCCA 127 at paras 15-16 [Mapara].
111. LVR, supra note 106 at para 8.
112. Khela v Mission Institution, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 SCR 502 [Khela].
113. LVR, supra note 106 at para 42 [emphasis added].
114. Khela, supra note 112 at para 34.
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for which lay with the state.115 A deprivation might be unlawful for an
absence of jurisdiction or procedural fairness. Khela added a third ground
of unlawfulness by permitting prisoners to challenge the reasonableness
of decisions that diminish their residual liberty."6 Since Khela, a detention
could be unlawful for being unreasonable.7
This is relevant to the proper interpretation of the third type of liberty
deprivation from Dumas. The habeas corpus challenge at issue in Dumas
was to a decision of the Parole Board of Canada reversing their earlier
decision to grant Dumas parole. The initial decision provided that the
granting of Dumas' parole was conditional. The reversal occurred before
the condition, which would have resulted in Dumas' being paroled, was
fulfilled. This factual finding was crucial to the Court's ultimate dismissal
of Dumas' challenge. Lamer CJ held that "[t]he continuation of an initially
valid deprivation of liberty can be challenged by way of habeas corpus
only if it becomes unlawful."18 But Dumas' detention was never unlawful
because Dumas had never actually acquired the status of a parolee. Because
Dumas' parole was conditional and the condition was never fulfilled, he
was never legally entitled to parole and his continued detention was not at
any point unlawful and was consequently unchallengeable.
The crucial point to take away from this analysis is that Dumas'
detention could have been unlawful, despite the fact that there were no
changes to the conditions of Dumas detention; namely, if his continued
detention was incompatible with the entitlements implied by his status as
a parolee. This contradicts Stromberg-Stein JA's dictum above.
There is no requirement in the Supreme Court jurisprudence that
a deprivation of liberty can only arise where there is a change in the
conditions of detention. Despite this, Stromberg-Stein JA explicitly claims
that there must be a change in the conditions of detention:
[a] decision denying an inmate access to less restrictive conditions
does not constitute... a deprivation. Dumas held that habeas corpus
was not available to challenge a decision to revoke parole before parole
was actually granted because there was no substantial change in the
conditions of detention; hence there was no change in the inmate's
residual liberty."9
115. May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 at para 74, [2005] 3 SCR 809.
116. Khela, supra note 112 at para 72.
117. Ibid at para 74: "a decision will be unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, if an inmate's liberty
interests are sacrificed absent any evidence or on the basis of unreliable or irrelevant evidence, or
evidence that cannot support he conclusion."
118. Dumas, supra note 101 at para 12.
119. LVR, supra note 106 at para 25.
438 The Dalhousie Law Journal
There are two problems with this passage. First, it misinterprets Dumas.
Dumas held that habeas corpus was not available to challenge a decision
to revoke parole before parole was actually granted because parole was
never actually granted. The Court pointed out that there were no substantial
changes in the conditions of Dumas' detention only to illustrate that there
were no other grounds to claim that there had been a liberty deprivation
of the second type. And Lamer CJ was clear that Dumas was challenging
the continuation of the deprivation of his liberty and not the conditions
thereof The conditions were not material to Dumas' claim-it was the
legality that mattered.12
The second problem with this passage is that by holding that a change
in the conditions of detention is a necessary pre-condition for finding a
deprivation of liberty, the third type of liberty deprivation identified in
Dumas ceases to exist. In considering whether a continuation of an initial
deprivation of liberty constitutes a deprivation challengeable by way of
habeas corpus, it is inappropriate to focus the analysis on the restrictiveness
of the conditions of detention. Doing so misses the point of distinguishing
between the second and third type of liberty deprivations and obscures the
impact of Khela on Dumas. "'
The impact is crucial. Dumas says that a continuation of an initial liberty
deprivation is challengeable only if it becomes unlawful. Khela says that
detentions can be unlawful for being unreasonable. Combining the two,
it becomes possible to answer the question "is a given continuation of an
initial liberty deprivation challengeable?" by asking: "is that continuation
reasonable?"
Reading Dumas and Khela together this way exposes the error in
Stromberg-Stein JA's reasoning. Stromberg-Stein JA declined to address
LVR's contestation of the reasonableness of the denial to lower his security
classification:
[w]ithout commenting on the merits of the appellant's objections relating
to the alleged assessment errors, the Charter and procedural fairness,
I am of the view that they reflect his misunderstanding of the scope,
purpose and remedial ambit of the writ of habeas corpus. A court
hearing a petition for habeas corpus ... cannot consider the lawfulness
120. Frankel J.A. makes the same mistake inMapara, supra note 110, where he states at para 17 that
the Court inDumas rejected the challenge to the Board's decisionbecause "the Board had not affected
his residual liberty interests because its decision to revoke did not result in Mr. Dumas being subjected
to a more restrictive form of confinement." Again, Dumas was not challenging the conditions of his
confinement, so whether they had changed or not did not matter.
121. See Gogan v R (Attorney General), 2017 NSCA 4, where the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal is
careful to confine the precedential value of LVR to its specific facts. The Court in Gogan carefully
distinguishes between the second and third type of deprivation at paras 53-54.
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of the administrative body's decision unless there is a deprivation of
residual liberty.'22
But this cannot be right. Rather, a court must consider the lawfulness
(including the reasonableness) of the decision at issue in order to
determine if there is a challengeable deprivation of liberty. Stromberg-
Stein JA ignores the third category of deprivation identified in Dumas and
its relationship to unlawfulness (i.e. reasonableness).123 The court must
first ask if the decision is lawful in order to determine if the continuation
of the initial deprivation is itself lawful, and therefore challengeable by
way of habeas corpus.
124
a. The objective of the Community Release policy
Section 8 1(1) ofthe CCRA states that "[t]he Minister, oraperson authorized
by the Minister, may enter into an agreement with an Indigenous community
for the provision of correctional services to aboriginal prisoners and for
payment by the Minister, or by a person authorized by the Minister, in
respect of the provision of those services."'25 Section 81 is worded broadly
-no eligibility criteria are specified. The Correctional Investigator has
stated that section 81 was introduced to:
provide options for care and custody to the broadest number of Aboriginal
inmates (First Nations, Metis, and Inuit) in federal institutions in order
to eventually reduce over-representation; provide appropriate programs
and services to Aboriginal prisoners based on tradition and cultural
values; and reinforce relationships with Aboriginal communities.26
Additionally, where Parliament has enacted laws specific to Indigenous
peoples, the Supreme Court has discerned Parliament's intent by noting
122. LVR, supra note 106 at para 40.
123. Without knowing the basis of LVR's section 7 claim, it is easy to wonder why it is not relevant
to the deprivation question under a habeas corpus petition If the liberty deprivation alleged was not
framed in terms of a reasonably hypothetical person, but was related to LVR himself, it seems that if
that deprivation was made out, then that would support finding the deprivation claimed in respect of
the habeas petition If LVR's continued detention is the result of an arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly
disproportionate law or legislative policy, then should we not conclude that his continued detention is
unlawful for the purposes of habeas corpus?
124. Without addressing the analysis above, a line of Ontario cases has adopted the view that where
it is unreasonable to maintain a prisoner's security classification instead of lowering it, then that
prisoner is entitled to a lower classification Maintenance of the prisoner's classification is therefore
a continuation of their initial deprivation of liberty and challengeable by habeas corpus. See, e.g.,
Canada (Attorney General) v Hollinger, [2007] OJ No 3326, 2007 CanLII 36816 (ONSC). Although
Stromberg-Stein JA and several lower court decisions have not followed these decisions, in light of the
above it is at least arguable that they are more consistent with Khela and Dumas and therefore more
persuasive.
125. Supra note 6, s 81(1).
126. Spirit Matters, supra note 8 at para 12.
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the social and historical context within which the law was introduced. The
reasoning from Gladue is pertinent:
[t]he drastic overrepresentation of aboriginal peoples within both the
Canadian prison population and the criminal justice system reveals a sad
and pressing social problem. It is reasonable to assume that Parliament,
in singling out Aboriginal prisoners for distinct sentencing treatment in
s.718.2(e), intended to attempt to redress this social problem to some
degree. 127
Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that Parliament intended to redress
Indigenous overincarceration using section 81 agreements.
Unfortunately, in implementing section 81 of the CCRA, the
Community Release policy frustrates Parliament's intent by neutralizing
the remedial purpose of the law. This is not obvious on a plain reading of
the Community Release policy's stated purpose, which is:
to facilitate the care and custody of an offender in an Aboriginal
community where services address the rehabilitation of prisoners
through culturally, spiritually and traditionally relevant interventions and
programming; to facilitate access to an Aboriginal community with the
capacity to provide services and benefits within a positive environment
for Aboriginal prisoners that will assist them to become law-abiding
citizens; and to facilitate the development of skills though accessing the
broad Aboriginal social and community services networks that support
the reintegration of an offender.
28
The stated purpose of the policy is compatible with the purpose of the
section of the Act it implements. However, the directive frustrates its
own purpose and the purpose of section 81 by limiting eligibility criteria
to minimum security, or on a case-by-case basis, medium-security
prisoners.
129
The practical reality is that Indigenous prisoners released under section
81 are almost always released to a Healing Lodge, and access to Healing
Lodges is limited to minimum security prisoners. Each Healing Lodge
for men is a minimum-security facility. So even if the provision could be
interpreted in a non-restrictive way, consistent with the plain language and
intention of the CCRA, most Indigenous prisoners would not be able to
apply for relief under it: 83.9 percent of Indigenous prisoners are classified
at medium security or above. So, although a medium-security prisoner
can in principle enter into a section 81 agreement, the only communities
127. Supra note 6 at para 64.
128. GL 710-2-1, supra note 11.
129. Ibid at para 9(a).
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that accept Indigenous prisoners in practice are Healing Lodges, and
Healing lodges are inaccessible to medium-security prisoners who are
men. There is thus no individualized assessment possible in those cases.
I think it is reasonable to conclude that the purpose of section 81 is to
reduce Indigenous overrepresentation, and to deliver culturally specific
programming to aid in the rehabilitation of prisoners in a manner that is
consistent with public safety.
b. The effects of the Community Release policy
The effects of the eligibility criterion of the Community Release policy are
several. First, maximum security prisoners are ineligible for a section 81
release. Second, medium security prisoners are in practice ineligible for a
section 81 transfer to a community-run Healing Lodge. These effects are
liberty deprivations under the third type from Dumas.
c. Disconnect between objective and effect
The disconnect between the effect of absolutely prohibiting maximum
security prisoners from transferring under a section 81 agreement and the
purposes of reducing Indigenous overincarceration, providing culturally
specific programming within Indigenous communities to aid in the
rehabilitation of prisoners, and ensuring public safety is straightforward.
The disconnect is most clearly illustrated by a comparison with parole.
Maximum-security prisoners are not absolutely prohibited from
applying for parole. Rather, their eligibility to apply is determined
by statute, and the decision to grant or deny parole is informed by an
individual assessment.13 Granted, few maximum-security prisoners are
released on parole, but some are.13 Why then, in the context of parole,
is individualized assessment appropriate and consistent with the goals of
rehabilitation and the maintenance of a just, safe, and peaceful society,
but not in the context of section 81 transfers? If it is safe to parole some
maximum-security prisoners, then it must be possible to do the same within
a section 81 agreement. The effect of the absolute prohibition therefore
appears to be overbroad for those individuals who could potentially be
granted parole but not a section 81 transfer, in addition to those who are
assigned a maximum-security classification purely on the basis of non-
predictive subscale items, keeping in mind that all prisoners serving life
sentences will be classified as maximum security given the distribution
of points for "sentence length," regardless of their scores on other, more
predictive, items.
130. CCRA, supra note 6, ss 102(a)-(b).
131. See chart onp 418.
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Medium-security prisoners are in practice ineligible to transfer to
existing section 81 Healing Lodges although the policy seems to provide
for individualized assessment on a "case-by-case" basis. It may be said
that medium-security prisoners therefore have a diminished hope of
eligibility. This effect is arbitrary given the above finding of arbitrariness
and overbreadth in respect of the CRS. It is not rational to impose a more
stringent eligibility requirement on all medium security prisoners where
some have been arbitrarily categorized as such. The use of non-predictive
scale items, for any given prisoner, could mean the difference between
minimum, medium, or maximum security. There is no rational connection
between the effect of a diminished hope of eligibility and the objectives
of reducing Indigenous overrepresentation, assisting in rehabilitation by
providing culturally specific programming, and ensuring public safety.
I conclude that a prisoner whose security classification results from the
contribution in points from non-predictive scale items in the CRS may
challenge that decision by way of habeas corpus. Decisions to deny section
81 transfers based on those same security classifications will therefore be
unreasonable.
Conclusion
Indigenous overrepresentation in prisons remains a significant issue
in Canada. One factor that contributes to this issue is the underutilized
remedial provision in section 81 of the CCRA. I argue that the policy
implementation of section 81 frustrates its remedial potential by imposing
a minimum-security eligibility requirement, thereby excluding over
80 percent of Indigenous prisoners from possibly attaining a section 81
release. I advance the claim that the security classification scheme used by
the CSC is unconstitutional, and that the eligibility requirement is therefore
unconstitutional by association. I conclude that prisoners can challenge
arbitrary classifications resulting from the contribution in points from
non-predictive subscale items by way of habeas corpus. In these cases,
a decision to deny a section 81 transfer based on the impugned security
classification will also be unreasonable. I suggest hat the defectiveness of
the Custody Rating Scale demands its disuse. Further, I offer modifications
that would make it Charter compliant, such as removing the non-predictive
subscale items. These measures would begin to respond to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's Call to Action 35.
